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Abstract
Capital allocation principles are used in various contexts in which the risk capital or
the cost of an aggregate position has to be allocated among its constituent parts. We study
capital allocation principles in a performance measurement framework. We introduce the
notation of suitability of allocations for performance measurement and show under differ-
ent assumptions on the involved reward and risk measures that there exist suitable allo-
cation methods. The existence of certain suitable allocation principles generally is given
under rather strict assumptions on the underlying risk measure. Therefore we show, with
a reformulated definition of suitability and in a slightly modified setting, that there is a
known suitable allocation principle that does not require any properties of the underlying
risk measure. Additionally we extend a previous characterization result from the literature
from a mean-risk to a reward-risk setting. Formulations of this theory are also possible in
a game theoretic setting.
Keywords Risk capital allocation, subgradient allocation, cost allocation, suitability for
performance measurement, reward measure, risk measure
1 Introduction
Capital allocation principles are used in various contexts in which the risk capital or a cost of an
aggregate position has to be allocated among its constituent parts. The aggregate position, for
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of the paper.
instance, can be a portfolio of credit derivatives, the profit, cost or turnover of a firm or simply
the outcome of a cooperative game. The importance of capital allocation principles in credit
portfolio modeling is outlined in Kalkbrener et al. (2004). Capital allocations can even be used
to construct tax schemes for pollution emission, see Cheridito and Kromer (2011). In any case
one is interested in how to allocate (distribute) the aggregate cost/profit among the units which
are involved in generating this cost/profit.
The main financial mathematics literature dealing with this topic follows a structural ap-
proach to capital allocations and studies the properties of specific allocation methods. Kalkbrener
(2005), for instance, studies in detail the properties of the gradient allocation and places them
in context with the properties of the underlying coherent risk measure. Other contributions,
like Denault (2001), Fischer (2003) and McNeil et al. (2005), similarly focus on the gradi-
ent allocation and study its properties. This allocation method only exists if the underlying
risk measure is Gaˆteaux-differentiable. This requirement is a strong one and several risk mea-
sures in general fail to be Gaˆteaux-differentiable. For an overview of this aspect we refer to
Cheridito and Kromer (2011). For the existence of the subgradient allocation that was intro-
duced in Delbaen (2000), we need weaker requirements. Continuity of the underlying risk
measure, to name one, is a sufficient condition to ensure the existence of a subgradient alloca-
tion, see Theorem 2.4.9 in Zalinescu (2002). There are also allocation principles in the literature
that do not require any properties of the risk measure and still have some desirable structural
properties. Recent examples for such allocation principles are the ordered contribution alloca-
tions from Cheridito and Kromer (2011) or the with-without allocation from Merton and Perold
(1993) and Matten (1996).
In this work we will focus on another aspect of capital allocation methods. These can be
used as important tools in performance measurement for portfolios and firms, and consequently
for portfolio optimization. The literature that studies capital allocations in this framework, to
our knowledge, narrows down to the works of Tasche (2004) and Tasche (2008). He studies
the gradient allocation principle based on Gaˆteaux-differentiable risk measures and uses mean-
risk ratios as performance measures. He introduces a definition of suitability for performance
measurement for capital allocations and characterizes the gradient allocation as the unique al-
location that is suitable for performance measurement. This is a different approach to this topic
compared to the structural approaches we previously mentioned. We will take up and extend this
approach in different directions. We will show in Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.9, with a slightly
modified definition of suitability, that we can relax the requirement of Gaˆteaux-differentiability
of the underlying risk measure to a (local) continuity property. This indeed preserves the ex-
istence of capital allocations that are suitable for performance measurement, but we loose the
uniqueness. As we will show, any subgradient allocation is suitable for performance measure-
ment. If the underlying risk measure is Gaˆteaux-differentiable, the subgradient allocation is
unique and reduces to the gradient allocation. In this case our result reduces to the result of
Tasche (2004). In another setting, where we restrict our performance measure to portfolios
that do not allow arbitrage opportunities and irrationality we are able to work with a stronger
formulation of suitability and to derive in this setting an existence and uniqueness result. In
the following we will work with classes of reward-risk ratios, which were recently introduced
in Cheridito and Kromer (2013). These are generalizations of mean-risk ratios from Tasche
(2004). We will show that a further modification of the definition of suitability for performance
measurement allows us to carry over the whole approach to a cooperative game-theoretic set-
ting and to consider cost allocation methods. This setting has the benefit that we do not require
any properties of the underlying cost function to ensure existence of suitable cost allocation
methods. Moreover, there is a direct connection to the risk-capital based setting that allows us
to apply these results directly to risk measures without requiring the risk measure to have any
specific properties.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we will introduce our notation and give
a short overview of the capital allocation methods that will be relevant for us in the remaining
work. We will work with reward-risk ratios as performance measures. These will be introduced
in Section 3. In this section we will furthermore introduce the definition of suitability for
performance measurement with reward-risk ratios and present our main results. In Section 4
we will modify the setting from Section 3 to a cooperative game-theoretic setting and show
in this new framework the existence of capital allocations that are suitable for performance
measurement.
2 Notation, definitions and important properties of risk measures
and capital allocations
A financial position, the value of a firm or the outcome of a cooperative game will be modeled
as a real valued random variable X from Lp, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, on a probability space (Ω,F ,P).
As usual, we identify two random variables if they agree P-a.s. Inequalities between random
variables are understood in the P-a.s. sense.
We will work with convex and with coherent risk measures ρ : Lp → R∪{+∞}. Coherent
risk measures were introduced and studied in Artzner et al. (1999). We will call a functional
from Lp to R∪{+∞} a coherent risk measure if it has the following four properties.
(M) Monotonicity: ρ(X)≤ ρ(Y ) for all X ,Y ∈ Lp such that X ≥ Y .
(T) Translation property: ρ(X +m) = ρ(X)−m for all X ∈ Lp and m ∈R.
(S) Subadditivity: ρ(X +Y )≤ ρ(X)+ρ(Y) for all X ,Y ∈ Lp.
(P) Positive homogeneity: ρ(λX) = λρ(X) for all X ∈ Lp and λ ∈R+.
From the properties (S) and (P) it follows that coherent risk measures are convex, accordingly
they satisfy the property
(C) Convexity: ρ(λX +(1−λ )Y )≤ λρ(X)+ (1−λ )ρ(Y) for all X ,Y ∈ Lp and λ ∈ (0,1).
Functionals with the properties (M), (T) and (C) are called convex risk measures. These were
introduced and studied in Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004) and Frittelli and Rosazza Gianin (2002).
We will denote the domain of a convex risk measure ρ with dom ρ = {X ∈ Lp |ρ(X)< ∞}. ρ
is a proper convex risk measure if the domain of ρ is nonempty. Since it only makes sense
to allocate a finite risk capital of an aggregate position among its constituent parts we will
only work with aggregate positions X from the domain of ρ . We know from the extended
Namioka-Klee Theorem from Frittelli and Biagini (2010) that proper convex risk measures are
continuous on the interior of their domain. From this it follows that finite valued convex risk
measures on Lp are continuous on Lp, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞. In particular proper convex risk measures on
L∞ are automatically finite and continuous on L∞. In the following we will need the concept of
the subdifferential of a convex risk measure on Lp. The subdifferential of a convex risk measure
at X ∈ dom ρ , 1 ≤ p < ∞ is the set
∂ρ(X) = {ξ ∈ Lq | ρ(X +Y )≥ ρ(X)+E[ξY ] ∀Y ∈ Lp} , (2.1)
where q is such that 1/q+1/p = 1 and Lq is the dual space of Lp. We will call ρ subdifferen-
tiable at X if ∂ρ(X) is nonempty. We know from Proposition 3.1 in Ruszczynski and Shapiro
(2006) that ρ with the properties (M) and (C) is continuous and subdifferentiable on the interior
of its domain. For p = ∞ we can consider the weak*-subdifferential introduced in Delbaen
(2000)
∂ρ(X) =
{ξ ∈ L1 ∣∣ ρ(X +Y )≥ ρ(X)+E[ξY ] ∀Y ∈ L∞}
In contrast to (2.1) this set can be empty at some points in L∞ even if the risk measure is finite
valued and thus continuous on L∞. For more details about the weak*-subdifferential we refer
to Delbaen (2000). It is known for a continuous risk measure ρ that ∂ρ(X) is a singleton if and
only if ρ is Gaˆteaux-differentiable, see for instance Corollary 2.4.10 in Zalinescu (2002). Then
E(ξY ) for ξ ∈ ∂ρ(X) and Y ∈ Lp is the Gaˆteaux-derivative at X in the direction of Y , ie,
E(ξY ) = lim
h→0
ρ(X +hY )−ρ(X)
h . (2.2)
All statements concerning the subdifferential of a convex risk measure obviously remain
true for the superdifferential of a concave reward measure which, with respect to the properties
(M)-(C) above, can be understood as the negative of a risk measure. The superdifferential of a
concave reward measure θ : Lp → R∪{−∞}, 1 ≤ p < ∞ at X ∈ dom θ is the set
∂θ(X) = {ψ ∈ Lq | θ(X +Y )≤ θ(X)+E[ψY ] ∀Y ∈ Lp} , (2.3)
where q is such that 1/q+ 1/p = 1 and Lq is the dual space of Lp. As before, the weak*-
superdifferential of θ at X ∈ dom θ is considered for p = ∞ as the set
∂θ(X) =
{
ψ ∈ L1
∣∣ θ(X +Y )≤ θ(X)+E[ψY ] ∀Y ∈ L∞} .
To be precise, we will call a map θ : Lp → R∪{−∞} a concave reward measure if it satisfies
(M) θ(X)≥ θ(Y ) for all X ,Y ∈ Lp such that X ≥Y .
(T) θ(X +m) = θ(X)+m for all X ∈ Lp and m ∈ R.
(C) θ(λX +(1−λ )Y )≥ λθ(X)+ (1−λ )θ(Y ) for all X ,Y ∈ Lp and λ ∈ (0,1).
We will call it coherent reward measure if satisfies the property (P) in addition to the properties
(M)− (C).
Consider now the aggregate position X = ∑ni=1 Xi ∈ dom ρ , n ∈ N. It is of interest for
several reasons outlined in the introduction, to allocate the aggregate risk capital ρ(X) to the
Xi, i = 1, . . . ,n, which are involved in generating this risk capital. We will denote a capital
allocation as a vector of real numbers k = (k1, . . . ,kn) ∈Rn. The simplest risk capital allocation
k ∈ Rn is the individual allocation given by
ki = ρ(Xi), i = 1, . . . ,n.
If the underlying risk measure is subadditive, which is property (S) of coherent risk measures,
then the individual allocation overestimates the total risk, ie,
ρ
(
n
∑
i=1
Xi
)
≤
n
∑
i=1
ρ(Xi) =
n
∑
i=1
ki.
A reasonable allocation principle should satisfy the above inequality as equality. This is then
usually called full allocation property or efficiency of the allocation,
ρ
(
n
∑
i=1
Xi
)
=
n
∑
i=1
ki. (2.4)
Since the individual allocation only depends on the risk of the individual asset or subportfolio
Xi and does not take into account the risk of the whole portfolio one is certainly interested in
other allocation principles. Another candidate, that additionally takes into account the risk of
the aggregate position is the with-without allocation,
ki = ρ(X)−ρ(X −Xi). (2.5)
This allocation principle, known from Merton and Perold (1993) and Matten (1996), will be
important in Section 4. For risk measures with property (S) both principles are related through
ρ(X)−ρ(X−Xi)≤ ρ(Xi),
such that the individual allocation is an upper bound for the with-without allocation. Neverthe-
less, both allocation principles in general do not satisfy the full allocation property if they are
based on coherent risk measures.
If the underlying risk measure is convex and the subdifferential of ρ at X is nonempty, then
for any ξ ∈ ∂ρ(X) we can consider the subgradient allocation,
ki = E(ξ Xi). (2.6)
This allocation principle was introduced in Delbaen (2000) with the weak*-subdifferential for
coherent risk measures on L∞. If ∂ρ(X) is a singleton the subgradient allocation reduces to
the gradient allocation which is also known as the Euler allocation, see Tasche (2008). Then
ki = E(ξ Xi) is the Gaˆteaux-derivative at X in the direction of Xi, ie,
ki = lim
hi→0
ρ(X +hiXi)−ρ(X)
hi
. (2.7)
It is known from Euler’s Theorem on positively homogeneous functions (see Tasche (2008),
Theorem A.1) that it satisfies the full allocation property if the risk measure is Gaˆteaux-diffe-
rentiable and positively homogeneous.
In the next sections we will highlight another aspect of capital allocations. We will study
capital allocations with respect to their ability to give an investor the right signals in a perfor-
mance measurement framework.
Before we move to the next section we will report in short the results of Tasche (2004)
which form the basis for this suitability-for-performance-measurement approach and which
we will generalize in the following. Let X = ∑ni=1 Xi be a portfolio consisting of n subport-
folios Xi, i = 1, . . . ,n. Let /0 6= U ⊂ Rn, n ∈ N, be an open set and define ρX : U → R,
ρX(u) := ρ(∑ni=1 uiXi). With mi = E[Xi] we similarly define EX(u) = E[∑ni=1 uiXi] = ∑ni=1 uimi.
Here each u ∈ U represents a portfolio. We denote by ei the i-th unit vector from Rn, ie
ei = (0, . . . ,0,1,0, . . . ,0) with 1 at the i-th position of the vector. A risk capital allocation is
identified in this setting by a map
k = (k1, . . . ,kn) : U → Rn.
Tasche (2004) considers in his approach mean-risk ratios, which are also called RORAC (return
on adjusted risk capital) ratios. These are defined by RORACX : U → R,
RORACX(u) :=
EX(u)
ρX(u)
, (2.8)
where in Tasche (2004) irrational portfolios (u ∈U such that EX(u) ≤ 0 and ρX(u) > 0) and
arbitrage portfolios (u ∈U such that EX(u) > 0 and ρX(u) ≤ 0) are completely excluded from
the approach. In this setting with mean-risk ratios as measures of performance Tasche (2004)
provides the following definition of suitability of capital allocations for performance measure-
ment.
Definition 2.1 (see Tasche (2004), Definition 3). We say that a vector field k : U →Rn is called
suitable for performance measurement with ρX if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) For all m ∈ Rn, u ∈U and i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} the inequality
miρX(u) > ki(u)EX (u) (2.9)
implies that there is an ε > 0 such that for all h ∈ (0,ε) we have
RORACX(u+hei)> RORACX(u) > RORACX(u−hei). (2.10)
(ii) For all m ∈ Rn, u ∈U and i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} the inequality
miρX(u) < ki(u)EX (u) (2.11)
implies that there is an ε > 0 such that for all h ∈ (0,ε) we have
RORACX(u+hei)< RORACX(u) < RORACX(u−hei). (2.12)
Note the strong requirement that inequalities (2.9) and (2.11) have to be true for all m ∈Rn.
With this definition of suitability for performance measurement Tasche (2004) provides the
following existence and uniqueness result.
Theorem 2.2 (see Tasche (2004), Theorem 1). Let ρX : U → R be a function that is partially
differentiable in U with continuous derivatives. Let k = (k1, . . . ,kn) : U → Rn be a continuous
vector field. Then the vector field k is suitable for performance measurement with ρX if and
only if
ki(u) =
∂
∂ui
ρX(u), i = 1, . . . ,n, u ∈U. (2.13)
If we take a closer look at the definition of suitability for performance measurement from
Tasche (2004) we see that a certain type of reward capital allocation for subportfolio Xi is fixed,
namely mi = E[Xi] in (2.9) and (2.11), whereas the risk capital allocation k = (k1, . . . ,kn) is in
the focus of investigation. This investigation then proves Theorem 2.2.
Our aim is to generalize the suitability framework of Tasche (2004) to a reward-risk setting
with a more general functional θ : Lp → R∪{−∞}, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, instead of the expectation. But
now a problem arises since Definition 2.1 can be interpreted in two ways. One way of reading
Definition 2.1 is to consider
ti = θ(Xi) = E[Xi] (2.14)
to be the reward capital allocation and thus to compare the standalone performance of Xi with the
performance of the portfolio X = ∑ni=1 Xi by considering the ratios θ(Xi)/ki and θ(X)/ρ(X) in
Definition 2.1. Since θ(X) = E[X ] is Gaˆteaux-differentiable there arises another interpretation
of Definition 2.1, namely to consider the Gaˆteaux-derivative of θ(·) = E[·] at X in the direction
of Xi,
ti = lim
hi→0
E[X +hiXi]−E[X ]
hi
= E[Xi] (2.15)
As we can see in (2.14) and (2.15) both concepts coincide if we consider θ(X) = E[X ] as a
reward measure. We will study both approaches in the following section and show that we can
generalize Tasche’s result in both cases. The case ti = θ(Xi) = E[Xi], which corresponds to the
individual reward capital allocation, will require certain structural properties of the functional
θ . This will be studied at the beginning of Section 3. The Gaˆteaux-derivative case will be
separately studied in the Subsections 3.1 and 3.2, where we will provide the direct extension
of Tasche’s result in Subsection 3.2. In Subsection 3.1 we won’t fix any specific reward capital
allocation. Instead we will focus on sufficient properties of reward-risk allocations such that the
allocation is suitable for performance measurement.
In contrast to Tasche (2004) we will consider reward-risk ratios that were recently intro-
duced in Cheridito and Kromer (2013) as measures of performance. This leads to the next
section.
3 Suitability for performance measurement with RRRs
In this section we will examine the connection of reward-risk ratios to capital allocations that
are suitable for performance measurement. Let us first introduce reward-risk ratios.
As performance measures in this work we consider reward-risk ratios (RRRs in short) of
the form
α(X) =


0, if θ(X)≤ 0 and ρ(X)> 0,
+∞, if θ(X)> 0 and ρ(X)≤ 0,
θ (X)
ρ(X) , else.
(3.16)
This means that we will measure the performance of the aggregate position X by a ratio with a
risk measure ρ : Lp →R∪{+∞} in the denominator and a reward measure θ : Lp →R∪{−∞}
in the numerator. Hereby 0/0 and ∞/∞ are understood to be 0. A reward measure θ : Lp →
R∪{−∞} in the setting of this section is a functional with property (P) and property
(S) Superadditivity: θ(X +Y )≥ θ(X)+θ(Y ) for all X ,Y ∈ Lp,
Classes of reward measures with these properties were recently studied in Cheridito and Kromer
(2013) as robust reward measures and distorted reward measures. We will shortly repeat their
definition here. Let P be a non-empty set of probability measures that are absolutely continu-
ous with respect to P. The robust reward measure is defined by
θ(X) = inf
Q∈P
EQ[X ]. (3.17)
θ defined in (3.17) obviously satisfies (S) and (P). Through the set P we can introduce ambi-
guity such that the elements of the set P could describe the beliefs of different traders. This
allows a much more general approach to the performance measurement framework than sim-
ply choosing the expectation for the numerator of the reward-risk ratio. A subclass of (3.17)
are distorted reward measures. Let ϕ : [0,1] → [0,1] be a non-decreasing function satisfying
ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1) = 1. It induces the distorted probability Pϕ [A] := ϕ ◦P[A]. If ϕ is convex
then the Choquet integral defined by
Eϕ [X ] :=
∫
∞
0
Pϕ [X > t]dt +
∫ 0
−∞
(Pϕ [X > t]−1)dt, (3.18)
is superadditive and positively homogeneous. Thus it satisfies (S) and (P). With different
choices for ϕ we can model different attitudes of agents towards rewards. For additional in-
formation about RRRs induced by coherent or convex risk measures in conjunction with these
reward measures we refer to Cheridito and Kromer (2013). Most important for us in this work
are the properties (S) and (P) and the existence of interesting classes of reward measures with
these properties. These classes obviously contain the expectation. Thus all statements in the
following sections are also true for mean-risk ratios (see e.g. (2.8)) as performance measures.
Now we will examine the connection of reward-risk-ratios to capital allocations that are
suitable for performance measurement. The following definition will clarify what we mean by
suitability for performance measurement with reward-risk ratios of type (3.16).
Definition 3.1. A risk capital allocation k ∈ Rn is suitable for performance measurement at
X ∈ dom ρ with a reward-risk-ratio α , if for any decomposition of X = ∑ni=1 Xi it satisfies the
following conditions:
1. If θ(X)≥ 0 then for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} there exists εi > 0 such that for all hi ∈ (0,εi)
θ(Xi)
ki
≥
θ(X)
ρ(X) (3.19)
implies
α(X)≥ α(X −hiXi) (3.20)
and
θ(Xi)
ki
≤
θ(X)
ρ(X) (3.21)
implies
α(X)≥ α(X +hiXi) (3.22)
2. If θ(X) ≤ 0 then for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} there exists εi > 0 such that for all hi ∈ (0,εi)
(3.19) implies
α(X +hiXi)≥ α(X) (3.23)
and (3.21) implies
α(X −hiXi)≥ α(X) (3.24)
The motivation behind this definition of suitability for performance measurement is similar
to the one in Tasche (2004) and Tasche (2008). Evidently, (3.19) and (3.21) relate the per-
formance of the aggregate position X , measured by α(X), to the performance of each unit Xi,
i = 1, . . . ,n, which is involved in generating the risk capital ρ(X). The performance of each
unit Xi, i = 1, . . . ,n, is measured by θ(Xi)/ki (assume for the sake of simplicity that ki > 0 and
ρ(X)> 0) and only those capital allocations k = (k1, . . . ,kn) are suitable for performance mea-
surement that send the right signals to the agent. The right signals in this context are represented
by (3.20) and (3.22) (in connection to (3.19) and (3.21)) and imply not to reduce the capital of
position Xi if the standalone performance of Xi is better than the performance of the aggregate
position X . On the other hand a worse standalone performance of Xi should send the signal not
to invest additional capital in this position. Summarized, this means
• α(X)≥ α(X −hiXi) do not reduce the capital in position Xi
• α(X)≥ α(X +hiXi) do not increase the capital in position Xi
• α(X +hiXi)≥ α(X) increase the capital in position Xi
• α(X −hiXi)≥ α(X) reduce the capital in position Xi
We will see in Subsection 3.2 that there is a stronger formulation of suitability for perfor-
mance measurement, but it also requires much stronger additional properties of the underlying
risk measure to guarantee the existence of suitable capital allocations.
For further statements we will need the following technical assumption on the underlying
risk measure.
(A) For an aggregate position X ∈ dom ρ and any decomposition (X1, . . . ,Xn) of X = ∑ni=1 Xi
there exists εi > 0 such that for all hi ∈ (0,εi) we have
• if ρ(X)> 0 then ρ(X −hiXi)> 0 and ρ(X +hiXi)> 0,
• if ρ(X)< 0 then ρ(X −hiXi)< 0 and ρ(X +hiXi)< 0.
for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
It should be noted that convex risk measures that are continuous at X ∈ dom ρ , automatically
satisfy assumption (A) at X .
Now we can examine which properties a capital allocation should have to be suitable for
performance measurement with a reward-risk ratio α at X ∈ dom ρ .
Theorem 3.2. Let θ : Lp → R∪{−∞}, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, be a functional with the properties ( ¯S) and
(P). Let ρ : Lp →R∪{+∞}, 1≤ p≤∞, be a map that satisfies condition (A) in X ∈ dom ρ and
let α be a reward risk ratio of type (3.16). Then a risk capital allocation k ∈ Rn that satisfies
the properties
hiki ≤ ρ(X +hiXi)−ρ(X) and (3.25)
hiki ≥ ρ(X)−ρ(X −hiXi) (3.26)
for all hi ∈ (0,εi), εi from (A), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and for any decomposition (X1, . . . ,Xn) of X = ∑ni=1 Xi
is suitable for performance measurement with α at X.
Proof. Consider first the case where numerator and denominator have the same signs. Let
θ(X)≥ 0. With assumption (A) for ρ at X ∈ dom ρ there exists εi > 0 such that for all hi ∈ (0,εi)
we have ρ(X)ρ(X + hiXi) > 0 and ρ(X)ρ(X − hiXi) > 0 for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. From (S) and
(P) we get θ(X −hiXi)≤ θ(X)−hiθ(Xi). This, together with (3.19) and (3.26) leads to
θ(X −hiXi)ρ(X)−θ(X)ρ(X −hiXi)
≤θ(X)(ρ(X)−hiki−ρ(X −hiXi))≤ 0,
which immediately implies α(X) ≥ α(X − hiXi). By analogous steps we get from (3.21) and
(3.25) the property α(X)≥ α(X +hiXi).
Now let θ(X)≤ 0. Then again with assumption (A) for ρ in X ∈ dom ρ there exists εi > 0
such that for all hi ∈ (0,εi) we have ρ(X)ρ(X + hiXi) > 0 and ρ(X)ρ(X − hiXi) > 0 for any
i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. From (S), (P), (3.19) and (3.25) we get
θ(X +hiXi)ρ(X)−θ(X)ρ(X +hiXi)
≥θ(X)(ρ(X)+hiki−ρ(X +hiXi))≥ 0,
which leads to α(X) ≤ α(X + hiXi). By analogous steps we get from (3.21) and (3.26) the
property α(X)≤ α(X −hiXi).
Let us now consider the case with θ(X) ≤ 0 and ρ(X) > 0. Here we have α(X) = 0 and
from (3.19) it follows that
α(X +hiXi)≥ α(X)
ρ(X)+hiki
ρ(X +hiXi)
= 0.
From (3.21) it follows that
α(X −hiXi)≥ α(X)
ρ(X)−hiki
ρ(X −hiXi)
= 0.
The remaining relevant case, in which θ(X) > 0 and ρ(X) < 0, leads to α(X) = +∞ and
since α(X +hiXi)≤+∞ and α(X −hiXi)≤+∞ we have finished the proof.
In Theorem 3.2, except for condition (A), we didn’t require any further properties like co-
herency or convexity from the risk measure ρ . We have only used the superadditivity and the
positive homogeneity of θ , which are the properties (S) and (P). The result nevertheless does not
guarantee the existence of allocations that satisfy the required properties of this theorem. How-
ever it gives us a suitability-criterion, which is easy to verify and thus gives us the opportunity
to check whether a capital allocation is suitable for performance measurement or not, without
requiring the risk measure to have any properties except (A). For instance we can immediately
see that the with-without allocation does not satisfy both of the properties (3.25) and (3.26). For
the following corollary that tells us which capital allocations satisfy (3.25) and (3.26) and thus
are suitable for performance measurement we will need the nonemptiness of the subdifferential
of ρ at X .
Corollary 3.3. Let θ : Lp → R∪{−∞}, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, be a be a functional with the properties
( ¯S) and (P). Let ρ : Lp → R∪ {+∞}, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, be a convex risk measure with nonempty
subdifferential at X ∈ dom ρ . Let α be a reward-risk ratio of type (3.16). If (A) is true for ρ at
X ∈ dom ρ then for any ξ ∈ ∂ρ(X) the subgradient risk capital allocation k ∈Rn defined by
ki := E[ξ Xi], for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} (3.27)
is suitable for performance measurement with α at X.
Proof. Since ∂ρ(X) is nonempty there exits ξ ∈ ∂ρ(X) for X ∈ dom ρ ⊆ Lp, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ such
that ki =E[ξ Xi], i= 1, . . . ,n, obviously satisfies (3.25) for any decomposition of X . Furthermore
for any decomposition (X1, . . . ,Xn) of X = ∑ni=1 Xi it satisfies
ρ(X −hiXi)−ρ(X)≥ E[ξ (−hiXi)]
for any hi ∈ (0,εi), i = 1, . . . ,n. This is equivalent to (3.26). Thus with Theorem 3.2 for any
ξ ∈ ∂ρ(X) any subgradient capital allocation ki = E[ξ Xi], ξ ∈ ∂ρ(X), i = 1, . . . ,n, is suitable
for performance measurement with α at X .
As outlined in Section 2 we know that convex risk measures on Lp, 1 ≤ p < ∞, are contin-
uous and subdifferentiable on the interior of their domain. Thus if the aggregate position X is
from the interior of the domain of ρ condition (A) and the nonemptiness of the subdifferential
of ρ at X are automatically satisfied. This leads to the next corollary.
Corollary 3.4. Let θ : Lp → R∪{−∞}, 1 ≤ p < ∞ be a functional with the properties ( ¯S) and
(P). Let ρ : Lp → R∪{+∞}, 1 ≤ p < ∞ be a convex risk measure and let α be a reward-risk
ratio of type (3.16). If the aggregate position X = ∑ni=1 Xi is from the interior of the domain
of ρ then the subdifferential of ρ at X is nonempty and any subgradient risk capital allocation
defined in (3.27) is suitable for performance measurement with α at X.
If we directly assume that the underlying convex risk measure is continuous at the aggregate
position X , then assumption (A) is satisfied, the subdifferential of ρ at X is nonempty and thus
the subgradient allocation exists and is suitable for performance measurement with a reward-
risk ratio α . Since the continuity of a convex risk measure ρ on Lp follows from the finiteness
of ρ on Lp, 1 ≤ p ≤∞ we can formulate the following corollary.
Corollary 3.5. Let θ : Lp → R, 1 ≤ p < ∞ be a functional with the properties ( ¯S) and (P). Let
ρ : Lp →R, 1≤ p < ∞ be a convex risk measure and let α be a reward-risk ratio of type (3.16).
Then the subdifferential of ρ at X is nonempty for any X ∈ Lp and any subgradient risk capital
allocation is suitable for performance measurement with α at any X ∈ Lp.
As already mentioned in Section 2, Gaˆteaux-differentiability of a continuous ρ at X leads
to the uniqueness of the subgradient of ρ at X . In this case the Gaˆteaux-derivative is the only
element of the subdifferential of ρ at X and thus the capital allocation defined in (2.7) is suitable
for performance measurement with a reward-risk ratio α at X . This allows us to formulate the
final corollary from Theorem 3.2.
Corollary 3.6. Let θ : Lp → R∪{−∞}, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ be a functional with the properties ( ¯S) and
(P). Let α be a reward-risk ratio of type (3.16). If the risk measure ρ : Lp → R∪{+∞}, 1 ≤
p ≤ ∞ is continuous and Gaˆteaux-differentiable at the aggregate position X, then the gradient
risk capital allocation, defined by
ki = lim
hi→0
ρ(X +hiXi)−ρ(X)
hi
, i = 1, . . . ,n, (3.28)
exists and is suitable for performance measurement with α at X.
Proof. This follows directly from Corollary 3.3 and the reasoning from Section 2.
Example 3.7. Assume that the underlying probability space is non-atomic. Distortion-expo-
nential risk measures from Tsanakas and Desli (2003) are defined as
ρψ ,a(X) =
1
a
lnEψ(exp(−aX)), (3.29)
where a > 0 and Eψ [·] is the Choquet integral from (3.18) with a concave map ψ . Let ψ be
differentiable. Then we know from Proposition 2 in Tsanakas (2009) that ρψ ,a is Gaˆteaux-
differentiable at X, if and only if F−1X is strictly increasing. The gradient risk capital allocation
in this case is given by
ki =
E[−Xie−aX ψ ′(FX(X))]
E[e−aX ψ ′(FX(X))]
,
where F−1X is the quantile function
F−1X (p) = inf{x ∈ R : FX(x)≥ p}.
Note that with ψ(t) = t this class of risk measures covers the entropic risk measure.
If we consider distortion risk measures that are defined as Choquet-integrals with a concave
map ψ , see (3.18), then from Carlier and Dana (2003) the following result holds. Let ψ be
differentiable. Then ρψ(X) = Eψ [−X ] is Gaˆteaux-differentiable if and only if F−1X is strictly
increasing. In this case the gradient risk capital allocation is given by
ki = E[−Xiψ ′(FX(X))].
As we have mentioned in Section 2 the interpretation ti = θ(Xi)=E[Xi] of the reward capital
allocation in Definition 2.1 is not the only one possible. Thus we will study the other case
ti = lim
hi→0
E[X +hiXi]−E[X ]
hi
= E[Xi]
in the following two subsections. In Subsection 3.1 we won’t fix a specific reward capital
allocation in the definition of suitability for performance measurement. In case of Gaˆteaux-
differentiable reward and risk measures this will nevertheless lead to gradient reward and risk
capital allocations. In Subsection 3.2 we will follow a similar approach as Tasche (2004) (see
Definition 2.1), fix the gradient reward capital allocation in the numerator and show that the
only risk capital allocation that is suitable for performance measurement is the gradient risk
capital allocation.
3.1 Suitability of reward-risk allocations for performance measurement
One way of dealing with portfolios that lead to arbitrage opportunities (θ(X)> 0 and ρ(X)≤ 0)
or are irrational (θ(X)≤ 0, ρ(X)> 0) is to set the performance measure for such portfolios to
+∞ respectively 0. This is the way we have followed in the previous section. Another way is
to restrict the performance measure to portfolios that do not allow for such possibilities. This is
the direction we will follow in this subsection. Let X be a subset of Lp, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, such that
for each X ∈X either
θ(X)> 0 and ρ(X)> 0 (3.30)
or
θ(X)< 0 and ρ(X)< 0 (3.31)
Here we do not fix any specific reward capital allocation in the definition of suitability for
performance measurement as we have done in Definition 3.1. Instead we will modify the defi-
nition of suitability to incorporate an arbitrary reward capital allocation t = (t1, . . . , tn) and show
in the following results the existence of reward-risk capital allocations (t,k) that are suitable for
performance measurement.
Definition 3.8. A reward-risk allocation (t,k) ∈ Rn ×Rn is suitable for performance mea-
surement at X ∈ X ∩ dom ρ ∩ dom θ with a reward-risk ratio α if for any decomposition of
X = ∑ni=1 Xi it satisfies the following conditions:
1. If θ(X)> 0 then for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} there exists εi > 0 such that for all hi ∈ (0,εi)
ti
ki
>
θ(X)
ρ(X) (3.32)
implies
α(X)> α(X −hiXi) (3.33)
and
ti
ki
<
θ(X)
ρ(X) (3.34)
implies
α(X)> α(X +hiXi). (3.35)
2. If θ(X) < 0 then for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} there exists εi > 0 such that for all hi ∈ (0,εi)
(3.32) implies
α(X +hiXi)> α(X) (3.36)
and (3.34) implies
α(X −hiXi)> α(X). (3.37)
The interpretation of this definition of suitability for performance measurement remains the
same as for Definition 3.1. We have only changed the measure of the standalone performance
of the units Xi, i = 1, . . . ,n. In Definition 3.1 we measure the standalone performance of Xi by
θ(Xi)/ki whereas in Definition 3.8 we change this to the ratio of reward-risk allocations ti/ki,
i = 1, . . . ,n. Again it is assumption (A) that allows us to formulate and prove a modification of
Theorem 3.2 to the suitability setting we have introduced in Definition 3.8.
Theorem 3.9. Let ρ : Lp → R∪{+∞}, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, be a map that satisfies condition (A) for
X ∈ X ∩ dom ρ ∩ dom θ . Then any reward-risk allocation (t,k) ∈ Rn ×Rn that satisfies the
properties
hiti ≥ θ(X +hiXi)−θ(X), (3.38)
hiti ≤ θ(X)−θ(X −hiXi), (3.39)
hiki ≤ ρ(X +hiXi)−ρ(X), (3.40)
hiki ≥ ρ(X)−ρ(X −hiXi), (3.41)
for all h∈ (0,εi), εi from (A), i = 1, . . . ,n, and for any decomposition (X1, . . . ,Xn) of X =∑ni=1 Xi
is suitable for performance measurement with α at X according to Definition 3.8.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2. However, here we don’t rely on the
properties (S) and (P) of θ . Instead we can use the properties (3.38) and (3.39) that are required
from the reward allocation. With assumption (A) for ρ at X ∈X ∩dom ρ ∩dom θ there exists
εi > 0 such that for all hi ∈ (0,εi) we have ρ(X)ρ(X +hiXi)> 0 and ρ(X)ρ(X −hiXi)> 0 for
any i = 1, . . . ,n. Let θ(X)> 0, then from (3.39) we get
θ(X −hiXi)ρ(X)−θ(X)ρ(X −hiXi)
≤θ(X)(ρ(X)−ρ(X −hiXi))−hitiρ(X).
Now (3.41) gives us
θ(X)(ρ(X)−ρ(X −hiXi))−hitiρ(X)≤ hi(θ(X)ki −ρ(X)ti).
With (3.32) this leads to α(X) > α(X − hiXi). Similarly we get from (3.38) and (3.40) the
inequality
θ(X +hiXi)ρ(X)−θ(X)ρ(X +hiXi)≤ hi(tiρ(X)− kiθ(X)).
With (3.34) this leads to α(X)> α(X +hiXi).
Now let θ(X) < 0. Since X ∈ X this means that ρ(X)< 0. From this, (3.38) and (3.40)
we get
θ(X +hiXi)ρ(X)−θ(X)ρ(X +hiXi)
≥hitiρ(X)+θ(X)(ρ(X)−ρ(X +hiXi))
≥hi(tiρ(X)− kiθ(X)).
Together with (3.32) this leads to α(X +hiXi)> α(X). By analogous steps we get from (3.39)
and (3.41)
θ(X −hiXi)ρ(X)−θ(X)ρ(X −hiXi)≥ hi(kiθ(X)− tiρ(X))
which leads with (3.34) to α(X −hiXi)> α(X).
As we have seen in Theorem 3.9 it was possible to carry over the suitability for performance
measurement approach from the beginning of Section 3 to a reward-risk capital allocation set-
ting. In a similar way as in Corollary 3.3 we can provide conditions for θ and ρ that guarantee
the existence of suitable reward-risk capital allocations. The next corollary summarizes the ana-
logue statements to the results that we have presented in Corollary 3.3 to Corollary 3.6. These
can be immediately recovered from the previous results.
Corollary 3.10. Let θ : X → R∪ {−∞} be a concave reward measure and let ρ : X →
R∪{+∞} be a convex risk measure. Then each of the following conditions is sufficient for the
reward-risk allocation (t,k) ∈Rn×Rn to exist and to be suitable for performance measurement
with the reward-risk ratio α at X according to Definition 3.8.
(a) ρ satisfies (A) at X ∈X ∩dom ρ ∩dom θ , the sets ∂θ(X) and ∂ρ(X) are nonempty and
for any ξ ∈ ∂ρ(X) and any ψ ∈ ∂θ(X) the reward-risk capital allocation (t,k)∈Rn×Rn
is given by
ti := E[ψXi] and ki := E[ξ Xi] (3.42)
for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
(b) X ∈X ∩ int(dom ρ)∩ int(dom θ)⊂ Lp, 1≤ p<∞ and the reward-risk capital allocation
(t,k) is of type (3.42) with ξ ∈ ∂ρ(X) and ψ ∈ ∂θ(X).
(c) θ and ρ are finite valued for any X ∈ Lp, 1≤ p<∞ and the reward-risk capital allocation
(t,k) is of type (3.42) with ξ ∈ ∂ρ(X) and ψ ∈ ∂θ(X).
(d) θ and ρ are continuous and Gaˆteaux-differentiable at the aggregate position X ∈X and
the reward-risk capital allocation (t,k) is given by
ki = lim
hi→0
ρ(X +hiXi)−ρ(X)
hi
,
ti = lim
hi→0
θ(X +hiXi)−θ(X)
hi
for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
Condition (d) from Corollary 3.10 allows us to continue Example 3.7.
Example 3.11. In the previous results we have included reward capital allocations to our ap-
proach. Thus we can continue Example 3.7, where we have considered distortion risk measures,
to incorporate distortion reward measures as in (3.18). Let the underlying probability space be
atomless. Let ϕ be a convex and ψ be a concave distortion function. Let both functions be
differentiable. Then θϕ(X) = Eϕ [X ] is a Gaˆteaux-differentiable coherent reward measure and
ρψ(X) = Eψ [−X ] is a Gaˆteaux-differentiable coherent risk measure. With this, according to
Definition 3.8, we have to check whether we have
ti
ki
=
E[Xiϕ ′(1−FX(X))]
E[−Xiψ ′(FX(X))]
>
Eψ [X ]
Eϕ [−X ]
or
ti
ki
=
E[Xiϕ ′(1−FX(X))]
E[−Xiψ ′(FX(X))]
<
Eψ [X ]
Eϕ [−X ]
to make a decision about the investment in subportfolio Xi.
Gaˆteaux-differentiable risk and reward measures allow us to formulate stronger results re-
garding suitability for performance measurement. Thus we will deal with this aspect in a sepa-
rate subsection.
3.2 Suitability for performance measurement with Gaˆteaux-differentiable re-
ward and risk measures
As in the previous subsection we will restrict our attention to portfolios that do not allow for
arbitrage opportunities or are irrational. Thus let /0 6=U ⊂ Rn be an open set such that for each
u ∈U either
ρX(u) := ρ
(
n
∑
i=1
uiXi
)
> 0 and θX(u) := θ
(
n
∑
i=1
uiXi
)
> 0, (3.43)
or
ρX(u) := ρ
(
n
∑
i=1
uiXi
)
< 0 and θX(u) := θ
(
n
∑
i=1
uiXi
)
< 0. (3.44)
Furthermore let U ⊂ Rn be such that ρ (∑ni=1 uiXi) ∈ R and θ (∑ni=1 uiXi) ∈ R. Analogously to
the previous section we define
αX (u) :=
θX(u)
ρX(u)
(3.45)
and denote reward and risk capital allocations, which are vector fields here, by
t = (t1, . . . , tn) : U → Rn
k = (k1, . . . ,kn) : U → Rn.
In this setting, as can be seen from the notation above, each u ∈U represents a portfolio. Here
we fix an arbitrary decomposition of X and the only assumption that will be needed for all
the following results is that θX and ρX are partially differentiable with continuous derivatives
in some u ∈ U . This corresponds to Gaˆteaux-differentiability of θ and ρ at some aggregate
position ∑ni=1 uiXi.
Now, following the lines of Tasche (2004), we can state a stronger definition of suitability
for performance measurement that fits this framework.
Definition 3.12. We deem a reward-risk allocation principle (t,k) suitable for performance
measurement with αX at u ∈U if the following two conditions hold:
1. For any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} there is some εi > 0 such that
ti(u)
ki(u)
>
θX (u)
ρX(u)
(3.46)
implies
αX (u+ sei)> αX(u)> αX (u− sei). (3.47)
for all s ∈ (0,εi).
2. For any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} there is some εi > 0 such that
ti(u)
ki(u)
<
θX (u)
ρX(u)
(3.48)
implies
αX (u− sei)> αX(u)> αX (u+ sei). (3.49)
for all s ∈ (0,εi).
Note the difference between our definition of suitability for performance measurement with
αX and the Definition 3 of Tasche (2004). Definition 3 of Tasche (2004) requires the capital
allocation k to satisfy (3.46) and (3.48) for all linear functions θ with θ(0) = 0 and all portfolios
u ∈U . In our formulation we restrict this requirement to a specific reward-risk ratio αX and a
specific portfolio u ∈U .
Furthermore note the difference between Definition 3.12 and the Definitions 3.1 and 3.8.
Definitions 3.1 and 3.8 have a one-sided nature in (3.20) and (3.22), respectively (3.33) and
(3.35), whereas in Definition 3.12 we are able to formulate (3.47) and (3.49) as
αX (u+ sei)> αX(u)> αX (u− sei)
αX (u− sei)> αX(u)> αX (u+ sei)
This is justified by the one-sided nature of the sub-, respectively superdifferential, of θ and
ρ that was needed to show existence of suitable capital allocations without the requirement
of Gaˆteaux-differentiability of θ and ρ . On the other hand, if we assume that θ and ρ are
Gaˆteaux-differentiable then the two-sided nature of the Gaˆteaux-derivative allows us to formu-
late a stronger version of suitability for performance measurement. This is the formulation of
Definition 3.12.
Now we can state and prove in a different way our version of Theorem 1 in Tasche (2004).
This version fits the requirements of our definition of suitability for performance measurement
with αX in u ∈U in conjunction with reward-risk ratios instead of mean-risk ratios. The fol-
lowing result characterizes the gradient risk capital allocation in this performance measurement
framework, if we fix the reward capital allocation to be the gradient reward capital allocation.
Theorem 3.13. Let /0 6= U ⊂ Rn be an open set such that (3.43) and (3.44) are true and let
θX : U → R and ρX : U → R be partially differentiable in u ∈U with continuous derivatives.
Furthermore let t = (t1, . . . , tn) : U →Rn and k = (k1, . . . ,kn) : U →Rn be continuous in u ∈U.
Let αX be a reward-risk ratio of type (3.45). Then we have the following two statements:
(a) The gradient reward-risk allocation (t,k), defined by
ti(u) :=
∂θX (u)
∂ui
, (3.50)
ki(u) :=
∂ρX(u)
∂ui
, i = 1, . . . ,n, u ∈U (3.51)
is suitable for performance measurement with αX at u ∈U.
(b) Let the reward capital allocation t = (t1, . . . , tn) : U →Rn be given by the gradient reward
capital allocation from (3.50). If a risk capital allocation k : U → Rn is suitable for
performance measurement with αX in u ∈U for any θX that is partially differentiable in
u ∈U, then it is the gradient risk capital allocation from (3.51).
Proof. Let us start with (a). Consider the partial derivative of αX in ui,
∂αX (u)
∂ui
= ρX(u)−2
(∂θX (u)
∂ui
ρX(u)−θX(u)
∂ρX (u)
∂ui
)
(3.52)
With (3.50) and (3.51), we get
∂αX (u)
∂ui
= ρX(u)−2 (ti(u)ρX (u)−θX(u)ki(u)) .
(3.46) now leads to
(
∂θX (u)
∂ui ρX(u)−θX(u)ki(u)
)
> 0 and therefore it follows that
∂αX(u)
∂ui
> 0.
This gives us the existence of εi > 0 such that (3.47) holds for all s ∈ (0,εi), i = 1, . . . ,n. The
proof of condition 2 in Definition 3.12 works analogously and the reward-risk capital allocation
from (3.50) and (3.51) is suitable for performance measurement with αX in u ∈U .
Let us now prove (b). Fix the reward capital allocation to be the gradient reward capital
allocation. Let k be suitable for performance measurement for any θX that is partially differen-
tiable in u ∈U . We want to show, that k corresponds to (3.51). Assume without any restriction,
that
ki(u)<
∂ρX(u)
∂ui
, i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. (3.53)
Since k is suitable for performance measurement with αX in u ∈U for any θX : U → R that is
partially differentiable in u ∈ U we can simply choose θ tX : U → R to be θ tX (u) = tρX(u) for
t > 0. This function is by assumption partially differentiable in u∈U for each t > 0. The choice
of θ provides us now with the following
∂θ tX (u)
∂ui
ρX(u)− ki(u)θ tX (u) = t
∂ρX(u)
∂ui
ρX(u)− ki(u)tρX (u)
= tρX(u)
(∂ρX(u)
∂ui
− ki(u)
)
.
Now, dependent on the sign of ρX , from (3.53) we either have
tρX(u)
(∂ρX(u)
∂ui
− ki(u)
)
> 0
which should lead to
αX(u+ sei)> αX (u)> αX(u− sei),
or we have
tρX(u)
(∂ρX(u)
∂ui
− ki(u)
)
< 0,
which should lead to
αX(u+ sei)< αX (u)< αX(u− sei),
since k is suitable for performance measurement with αX in u ∈ U . But we have αX(u) =
θ tX (u)
ρX (u) =
tρX (u)
ρX (u) = t and hence
αX (u+ sei) = αX(u) = αX (u− sei) or
∂αX (u)
∂ui
= 0,
which is a contradiction to the suitability assumption.
4 Suitability for performance measurement with non-divisible
portfolios and connections to a game theoretic context
Let N = {1, . . . ,n} and denote by 2N the set of all possible subsets of N. In this section we will
work with the functions
ϑ(S) := θ
(
∑
i∈S
Xi
)
and c(S) := ρ
(
∑
i∈S
Xi
)
(4.54)
where S is a subset of N and the maps θ : Lp → R and ρ : Lp → R, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, represent, with
the notation from the previous section, the reward and the risk measure. We have chosen this
approach to incorporate a study of suitability for performance measurement in a context where
it is not possible to further divide the subportfolios Xi of the portfolio X = ∑ni=1 Xi. Here it is
only possible to add or to remove the whole subportfolio Xi to or from the portfolio X .
Following the approach in Subsection 3.1 and 3.2 we will focus only on on portfolios that
do not allow for arbitrage gains or are irrational. Thus let G ⊂ 2N be such that for each S ∈ G
we either have
θ
(
∑
i∈S
Xi
)
> 0 and ρ
(
∑
i∈S
Xi
)
> 0
or
θ
(
∑
i∈S
Xi
)
< 0 and ρ
(
∑
i∈S
Xi
)
< 0.
Thus the functions ϑ and c are maps from G to R and we will work with the convention ϑ( /0) =
c( /0) = 0. In this context the reward-risk ratio becomes a map γ : G→ (0,∞) which is given by
γ(S) = ϑ(S)
c(S)
=
θ (∑i∈S Xi)
ρ (∑i∈S Xi)
and the risk capital allocation is a function κ : G→Rn where κi(S) specifies how much risk cap-
ital is allocated to each subportfolio Xi of the portfolio ∑i∈S Xi. With this notation we can state
the appropriate definition of suitability for performance measurement with γ in this context.
Definition 4.1. We will call a capital allocation κ suitable for performance measurement with
γ and a portfolio ∑i∈S Xi of non-divisible subportfolios if the following two conditions hold:
1. For any i ∈ N \S
θ(Xi)
κi(S)
=
ϑ({i})
κi(S)
>
ϑ(S)
c(S) =
θ
(
∑ j∈S X j
)
ρ
(
∑ j∈S X j
) (4.55)
implies that
θ
(
∑ j∈S∪{i}X j
)
ρ
(
∑ j∈S∪{i}X j
) = γ(S∪{i}) > γ(S) = θ
(
∑ j∈S X j
)
ρ
(
∑ j∈S X j
) . (4.56)
2. For any i ∈ N \S
θ(Xi)
κi(S)
=
ϑ({i})
κi(S)
<
ϑ(S)
c(S) =
θ
(
∑ j∈S X j
)
ρ
(
∑ j∈S X j
) (4.57)
implies that
θ
(
∑ j∈S∪{i}X j
)
ρ
(
∑ j∈S∪{i}X j
) = γ(S∪{i}) < γ(S) = θ
(
∑ j∈S X j
)
ρ
(
∑ j∈S X j
) . (4.58)
This definition of suitability differs from our previous definitions. Here, starting from a
portfolio ∑i∈S Xi, we are interested in risk allocations that give us the right information whether
to add a specific subportfolio Xi, i ∈ N \ S, to our portfolio ∑i∈S Xi or not. If the standalone
performance of subportfolio Xi (measured by ϑ({i})/κi(S)) is better than the performance of
the whole portfolio ∑i∈S Xi then the subportfolio Xi should be added to the portfolio to improve
the performance of the portfolio. On the other hand, if the standalone performance of the
subportfolio Xi, i ∈ N \S, is worse than the performance of ∑i∈S Xi then adding this subportfolio
to the portfolio should worsen the performance of ∑i∈S Xi.
The connection of this approach to a game theoretic setting can be established by consid-
ering the set N to be a finite set of players such that the subsets S ⊂ N can be interpreted as
coalitions of players. Then c(S) represents the cost and ϑ(S) represents the gain the coalition
of players S generates in a game. From the viewpoint of the coalition of players S we are inter-
ested in cost allocation principles that give us the right information whether to add player i to
our coalition S or not. In this context γ provides a possible tool and Definition 4.1 provides the
criteria that are needed to make such a decision.
For details about cooperative games we refer the reader to Shapley (1953), Hart and Kurz
(1983), Faigle and Kern (1992) and Branzei et al. (2005).
In cooperative game theory reward functions like ϑ (characteristic functions of a game) are
often assumed to satisfy certain properties like superadditivity, which is in this framework the
property
ϑ(S∪T )≥ ϑ(S)+ϑ(T ) for all S,T ⊆ N, S∩T = /0.
For the following proposition we will assume that the reward function ϑ satisfies a stronger
property, namely the additivity property
ϑ(S∪{i}) = ϑ(S)+ϑ({i}) (4.59)
for all i ∈ N and all S ⊆ N \{i}. We can see immediately that this property is equivalent to
ϑ(S∪T ) = ϑ(S)+ϑ(T ) for any S,T ⊆ N, S∩T = /0.
This property enables us to state conditions for allocations to be suitable for performance
measurement with γ and a coalition of players S∈G in a cooperative game-theoretic framework.
But we will not need ϑ to satisfy property (4.59) for all i ∈ N and all S ⊆ N \{i}. We will only
need the restriction to a specific coalition of players S ∈ G and any i ∈ N \S.
Proposition 4.2. If the reward function ϑ satisfies the additivity property (4.59) for the coalition
of players S ∈ G and any i ∈ N \S then any cost allocation κ that satisfies
κi(S)≥ c(S∪{i})− c(S) if c(S∪{i}) > 0 and (4.60)
κi(S)≤ c(S∪{i})− c(S) if c(S∪{i}) < 0 (4.61)
for any i ∈ N \S is suitable for performance measurement with γ and the coalition of players
S ∈ G.
Proof. From (4.55) together with the additivity property (4.59) of ϑ we get
γ(S∪{i})− γ(S) = ϑ(S∪{i})c(S)−ϑ(S)c(S∪{i})
c(S∪{i})c(S)
>
ϑ(S)[c(S)+κi(S)− c(S∪{i})]
c(S∪{i})c(S)
= γ(S) · c(S)+κi(S)− c(S∪{i})
c(S∪{i})
.
With (4.60) and (4.61) we get
γ(S∪{i})− γ(S)> 0.
Now, starting with (4.57) leads with the same arguments to
γ(S∪{i})− γ(S)< 0,
which finally proves the statement.
An obvious candidate for a capital allocation that is suitable for performance measurement
with γ and the coalition of players S is the marginal contribution allocation defined by
κi(S) := c(S∪{i})− c(S) = ρ
(
∑
j∈S
X j +Xi
)
−ρ
(
∑
j∈S
X j
)
. (4.62)
Thus a straightforward consequence of Proposition 4.2 is the following Corollary.
Corollary 4.3. If the reward function ϑ satisfies the additivity property (4.59) for the coalition
of players S ∈ G and any i ∈ N \S then the marginal contribution allocation defined in (4.62)
is suitable for performance measurement with γ and the coalition of players S ∈ G.
Useful properties a cost allocation in this framework can have are
Efficiency: c(N) = ∑ni=1 κi(N)
Symmetry: κi(N) = κ j(N) if c({i}∪S) = c({ j}∪S) for all S ⊆ N \{i, j}
Dummy Player Property: κi(N) = c({i}) if c({i}∪ S) = c({i})+ c(S) for every subset S ⊆
N \{i}.
By restricting the whole framework of this section to the set S = N \{i} the marginal contribu-
tion allocation corresponds to the so called with-without allocation, introduced in Merton and Perold
(1993) in a risk-capital context, see (2.5). The with-without allocation has the symmetry and
the dummy player property, but in general it fails to have the efficiency property. To achieve
efficiency for this allocation principle a simple normalization procedure,
ki =
ρ(X)−ρ(X −Xi)
∑nj=1 ρ(X)−ρ(X−X j)
ρ(X),
can be performed, but this is only possible if ∑nj=1 ρ(X)−ρ(X −X j) is nonzero.
The formulation of suitability for performance measurement in this section has a specific ad-
vantage. We have shown that there exists an allocation principle that is suitable for performance
measurement with a performance measure γ according to Definition 4.1. This allocation prin-
ciple is the with-without allocation known from Merton and Perold (1993) and Matten (1996).
Therefore, if one accepts Definition 4.1 as appropriate for a specific problem-setting the advan-
tage of this allocation, although in general it fails to have the efficiency property, is that it does
not require the cost function (accordingly the risk measure with the definition in (4.54)) to have
any specific properties. This allocation principle exists whether the underlying risk measure is
convex, continuous, Gaˆteaux-differentiable or not.
The framework of Subsection 3.2 corresponds, in contrast to this section, to a fractional
players framework in game theory (see Aumann and Shapley (1974)) and thus the results ob-
tained in Subsection 3.2 are easily transferable to a game theoretic setting by using a fractional
cost and reward function, ie,
ϑ(u) = θ
(
n
∑
i=1
uiXi
)
, u ∈U ⊂Rn
c(u) = ρ
(
n
∑
i=1
uiXi
)
, u ∈U ⊂Rn.
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